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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ana Giselle Herreman-Garcia appeals from her convictions for grand theft 
and forgery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Herreman-Garcia worked in the office of A&A Landscaping and managed 
several of the financial functions of the business including payroll, paying 
vendors, and recording payments on invoices. (Tr., p. 127, L. 10 - p. 130, L. 1; 
p. 173, L. 10-p. 178, L. 11; p. 263, L. 14-p. 264, L. 24.) Using that position 
she issued herself unauthorized checks, obtained duplicative paychecks or 
paychecks for hours not worked, and used a company financial card to pay 
private expenses and withdraw cash. (Tr., p. 134, L. 25 - p. 136, L. 22; p. 151, 
L. 20-p. 159, L. 23; p. 182, L. 17 p. 202, L. 10; p. 206, L. 24-p. 214, L. 1; p. 
264, L. 25 - p. 275, L. 2; p. 278, L. 2 - p. 286, L. 24; p. 354, L. 25 - p. 370, L. 20; 
p. 377, L. 17 - p. 421, L. 23; Exhibits 1 (Exhibits file, pp. 2-124), 2 (Exhibits file, 
pp. 125-34), 8 (Exhibits file, pp. 151-621), 9 (Exhibits file, pp. 622-1505), 10 
(Exhibits file, p. 1506), 11 (Exhibits file, p. 1507), 12 (Exhibits file, p. 1508).) She 
also altered checks issued to the business from customers, making them payable 
to herself. (Tr., p. 101, L. 22 - p. 112, L. 1; p. 114, L. 8 - p. 123, L. 12; p. 202, L. 
11 - p. 206, L. 23; p. 275, L. 3 - p. 278, L. 1; p. 287, Ls. 2-25; p. 421, L. 24 - p. 
425, L. 16; Exhibits 3 (Exhibits file p. 135), 4 (Exhibits file, pp. 136-141 ), 5 
(Exhibits file, p. 142), 6 (Exhibits file, pp. 143-148).) The state ultimately 
presented evidence that Herreman-Garcia stole from her employer employing 
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four different methods: misuse of a debit card; obtaining paychecks that were 
duplicative or for hours not worked; issuing company checks to herself; and 
altering and cashing checks submitted by the business's clients to pay for 
services by making them payable to her personally. (Tr., p. 389, Ls. 1-18.) 
The state charged Herreman-Garcia with one count of grand theft for 
taking money from her employer between March 19, 2009 and October 31, 2011 
and one count of forgery for adding her name to checks written by third parties to 
her employer. (R., pp. 52-53.) The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 100-
13.) The jury found Herreman-Garcia guilty on both counts. (R., pp. 113, 134-
35.) The court entered judgment, from which Herreman-Garcia timely appealed. 
(R., pp. 164-66, 170-74.) On appeal Herreman-Garcia asserts multiple trial 
errors, most of which were not preserved for appellate review. (Appellant's brief.) 
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ISSUES 
Because Herreman-Garcia's statement of the issues sets forth as fact 
legal claims the state asserts are without merit, her statement of the issues is not 
set forth here. The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Herreman-Garcia failed to show fundamental error in the notice 
provided by the information regarding Count I? 
2. Has Herreman-Garcia failed to show fundamental error in the absence of 
a special unanimity instruction? 
3. Has Herreman-Garcia failed to show that the district court erred by holding 
irrelevant questions about whether an audit showed A&A owed additional 






Herreman-Garcia Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Notice 
Provided By The Information Regarding Count I 
Introduction 
In Count I of the information the state charged Herreman-Garcia with 
"GRAND THEFT, FELONY, I.C. §[§] 18-2403(1 ), 2407(1 )(b), 2409" committed as 
follows: 
That the Defendant, ANA GISELLE HERREMAN GARCIA, on or 
between the 9th day of March, 2009 and the 31st day of October, 
2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take cash 
of a value in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) lawful 
money of the United States from the owner, A&A Landscape, with 
the intent to appropriate to herself certain property of another. 
(R., pp. 52-53.) At trial, Herreman-Garcia objected, on relevance and 1.R.E. 
404(b) grounds, to admission of evidence that Herreman-Garcia had stolen 
money through checks (including paychecks), asserting the state's charge was 
limited to thefts of cash by use of a debit card. (Tr., p. 132, L. 17 - p. 133, L. 23; 
p. 136, L. 23- p. 147, L. 12; p. 184, L. 11 - p. 185, L. 23; see also R., pp. 143-44 
(further setting forth the defense theory that the state was limited to theft of 
"cash" and that creation of unauthorized checks on her own behalf was not theft 
of "cash").) The trial court held that the evidence was within the scope of the 
charge. (Tr., p. 147, L. 13- p. 150, L. 19; p. 185, L. 24- p. 186, L. 1.) 
On appeal, Herreman-Garcia argues that Count I "does not meet the due 
process requirements of providing factual specificity" because it did not "inform 
[her] of the means of committing theft with which she was charged." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 20-22.) This is a different issue than the one she raised at trial. She 
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has failed, however, to show fundamental error. Indeed, the issue Herreman-
Garcia attempts to raise for the first time on appeal-that the notice was 
inadequate for not setting forth a specific method of theft-is an issue that was 
waived because it was not raised prior to trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether an information conforms to the requirements of law is "a question 
subject to free review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 
(2004). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review 
an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant 
must show that some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." ~ at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Herreman-Garcia's Appellate Argument That The State Failed To Allege 
The Means By Which She Committed The Theft Is Not Preserved For 
Appellate Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). "For an 
objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for the 
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objection must be clearly stated" State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 
494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1); State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 
586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)). Furthermore, to preserve an issue 
for appellate review, a party must obtain a ruling from the trial court. State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699, 760 P.2d 27, 38 (1988); State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 
554, 557, 224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In order for an issue to be 
raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis 
for the assignment of error."); see also State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, _, 343 
P.3d 497, 504 n.3 (2015) (burden is on movant to obtain ruling on motion, and 
failure to do so constitutes abandonment). Review of the record shows that 
Herreman-Garcia's appellate claim that Count I of the information was defective 
for failing to allege the means by which she accomplished the theft was not 
preserved for appellate review. 
Below, Herreman-Garcia objected to the admission of evidence that she 
stole from her employer through improper checks, claiming she was charged only 
with stealing cash through unauthorized use of a financial transaction card, and 
therefore the evidence regarding theft by checks was inadmissible. (Tr., p. 132, 
L. 17 - p. 133, L. 23; p. 136, L. 23 - p. 147, L. 12; p. 184, L. 11 - p. 185, L. 23.) 
Specifically, counsel argued that the crime of getting cash out of an ATM with a 
debit card and issuing herself checks on her employer's account are "entirely 
d"1fferen+ th"1nr1s" /Tr p 142 I s 4-17 \ "Thoso t"1me r~rrlc::. aro an i:>ntirelv n. \.I I 1::::::f , \ I I, J , I f I- , f • / I 1'-' ...... I '"'II.Al -- - , -• ''"'' J 
separate manner of theft," trial counsel argued, and therefore evidence of 
improperly issued paychecks was not relevant to the charge. (Tr., p. 138, Ls. 12-
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15.) Because the checks related to an uncharged theft, according to trial 
counsel, evidence that Herreman-Garcia had stolen by use of checks was also 
inadmissible evidence of uncharged misconduct under I.R.E. 404(b). (Tr., p. 
138, L. 22 - p. 139, L. 10.) Thus, although trial counsel claimed "surprise" that 
the state offered evidence of "an entirely different type of theft" than misuse of 
the debit card (Tr., p. 138, L. 22 - p. 139, L. 3) and claimed he was "under the 
understanding" that evidence of the theft would be limited to evidence of misuse 
of the debit card (Tr., p. 142, L. 25 - p. 143, L. 7), his theory was consistently that 
the state had limited itself to one method of theft (theft of cash by misuse of the 
debit card), which rendered inadmissible evidence of other methods of theft 
(issuing unauthorized checks and unearned paychecks to herself). In short, the 
claim below was that evidence of theft by checks was a variance from the 
charging document, which alleged only theft by debit card. See, ~' State v. 
Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 972-73, 188 P.3d 912, 914-15 (2008) (variance occurs 
when jury convicts on facts different than those pied in the charging document); 
State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893, 673 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983) ("an 
accused person is denied due process by variance between the crime charged in 
a prosecutor's information and the crime upon which a judgment of conviction is 
entered"). 
On appeal, however, Herreman-Garcia does not claim a variance or that 
the trial court erred by allowing admission of evidence of a "different type of theft" 
than charged, but instead asserts that she lacked notice in Count I of any method 
of theft. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-28.) Her claim is not that events at the trial 
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were a variance from the charge, but is rather a challenge to the language of the 
charge itself. (Id.) Herreman-Garcia's appellate claim that the charging 
document itself does not set forth sufficient facts to provide notice is therefore not 
preserved for appellate review because it is a different issue than raised by the 
objection below. 
The distinction between the objection at trial and the argument raised on 
appeal is also important to the preservation question for a different reason. It is 
well established that "[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the ... 
information" must be "raised prior to trial." I.C.R. 12(b)(2). As noted above, trial 
counsel asserted that Count I of the information did provide adequate notice, but 
that the charge was limited to thefts of cash by the debit card and did not include 
theft by issuance of unauthorized checks; and therefore evidence of methods of 
theft other than misuse of the debit card were rendered inadmissible. Such a 
claim is not a claim of a "defect in the ... information," but is a claim that the 
charge is specific and that the error related to admission at trial of evidence 
unrelated to the charge creating a variance. Appellate counsel, however, 
contends Count I failed to provide notice of the method of theft. The appellate 
claim is therefore a claim of a "defect in the ... information" (lack of notice of the 
method of theft) that must be raised "prior to trial." I.C.R. 12(b)(2). Because 
Herreman-Garcia's appellate challenge "is one of due process," specifically 
"whether the charging document sufficiently advises the defendant of the nature 
of the charge," it is waived because "not raised prior to the commencement of 
trial." State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 (2005). 
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Review of Herreman-Garcia's appellate claim of inadequate notice shows 
that it is raised for the first time on appeal and, more importantly, was a claim that 
was required to be raised prior to trial. Her appellate claim of inadequate notice 
must be deemed waived because not timely raised. 
D. Even If The Argument Was Not Waived Because Not Raised Before Trial, 
Herreman-Garcia Has Failed To Show A Due Process Violation 
"An information must be specific enough to advise a defendant as to the 
particular section of the statute he or she is being charged with having violated 
and, in addition, must set forth a concise statement of the facts constituting the 
alleged offense sufficient that the particular offense may be identified with 
certainty as to time, place and persons involved." State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 
149, 151, 75 P.3d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 
211, 404 P.2d 347, 351 (1965)). An information charging theft "is sufficient if it 
alleges that the defendant stole property of the nature or value required for the 
commission of the crime charged without designating the particular way or 
manner in which such property was stolen or the particular theory of theft 
involved." l.C. § 18-2409(1 ). A defendant is not entitled to '"notice of the 
evidence that the state plans to use to prove the charges."' State v. Abdullah, 
158 Idaho 386, _, 348 P.3d 1, 75 (2015) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 
152, 167-67 (1996)). 
Review of Count I of the information shov,1s it clearly meets these 
standards. The charge specifically cites the subsection under which Herreman-
Garcia was charged (I.C. § 18-2403(1 )), and explicitly sets forth the "time, place 
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and persons involved" ("between the 9th day of March, 2009 and the 31st day of 
October, 2011 "; "in the County of Ada, State of Idaho"; and "ANA GISELLE 
HERREMAN GARCIA" and "A&A Landscape"). (R., pp. 52-53.) The lack of any 
mention of the debit card or the unauthorized checks as the mechanisms by 
which she accomplished the theft of cash was not a required part of the pleading. 
Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151, 75 P.3d 203, 205 (information provides adequate 
notice if it identifies particular subsection was violated and identifies "time, place 
and persons involved"); I.C. § 18-2409(1) (information need not include "the 
particular way or manner in which such property was stolen or the particular 
theory of theft involved"). The charging document met the applicable legal 
standards. 
Herreman-Garcia claims otherwise. First, she cites to State v. Owen, 129 
Idaho 920, 928 n.8, 935 P.2d 183, 191 n.8 (Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition 
that I.C. § 18-2409(1) should be ignored by prosecutors because it may not meet 
due process requirements. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22.) This argument fails 
because Herreman-Garcia has not challenged, either below or on appeal, the 
constitutionality of that statute. The state specifically cited that statute as a basis 
for its pleading. (R., p. 52.) If the state's reliance on the statute-which 
specifically relieves the state of any duty to plead the method of theft-was 
misplaced, Herreman-Garcia had a duty to challenge that reliance before trial. 
Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622, 115 P.3d at 713 (claims of defects in the charging 
document such as alleged lack of notice must be raised prior to trial or are 
waived). 
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Moreover, Herreman-Garcia has failed to show that a charging document 
must specify "a particular method or way" that the theft was committed, such that 
it must allege that the cash was stolen by misuse of a credit card and issuing 
herself unauthorized checks. To the contrary, the charging document must 
specify what law was broken and allege the "time, place and persons involved." 
State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151, 75 P.3d 203, 205 (2003). See also Paterno 
v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 320-21 (1948) (charge of receiving stolen property 
sufficient to provide notice of charge of larceny for purposes of guilty plea). 
Indeed, by rule the state may allege that the "means by which the defendant 
committed the offenses are unknown." I.C.R. 7(b). The "means by which" 
Herreman-Garcia accomplished the theft was not a requirement of an adequate 
pleading. 
Finally, "a court can look to sources outside the charging document to 
determine whether a defendant had adequate notice of a particular theory of the 
case." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917 (emphasis added). 
Herreman-Garcia was notified as to the state's allegations of what she stole 
("cash" as opposed to other personal property), when she stole it (between 
March 9, 2009 and October 31, 2011), from whom she stole it (A&A 
Landscaping), with what intent she stole (intent to appropriate), and what statute 
she violated (I.C. §§ 18-2403(1 ), 2407(1 )(b)). (R., pp. 52-53.) As set forth below, 
theft by checks vvas specifically covered in the discovery and preliminary' hearing. 
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Setting forth the exact means by which she stole the cash from A&A 
Landscaping was not a requirement for a proper pleading. 1 Review of the record 
shows no error, much less fundamental error. 
Herreman-Garcia next argues that the defense was "clearly" taken by 
surprise to learn that the checks (as opposed to the debit card) were part of this 
case, citing as evidence the absence of any mention of checks in the opening 
argument, the objections to admission of evidence regarding the checks as 
evidence, and trial counsel's request for a recess to discuss Exhibit 2 with the 
defendant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-25.) The claim of surprise is far from clear 
on this record, however, which is in fact more consistent with trial counsel making 
the tactical decision to try and exclude evidence at trial on a variance theory 
rather than challenging the adequacy of the notice provided in the information 
prior to trial. 
It was undisputed that the prosecution, in discovery, provided trial counsel 
evidence regarding the unauthorized checks even prior to the preliminary 
hearing, including the police reports discussing the theft by checks. (Tr., p. 139, 
L. 21 - p. 140, L. 5; p. 142, L. 22 - p. 143, L. 1; p. 146, L. 13 - p. 147, L. 12; PSI, 
pp. 37-45.) As noted by the trial court (Tr., p. 147, Ls. 18-25), at the preliminary 
hearing Herreman-Garcia's counsel elicited testimony that the only victim to 
testify believed unauthorized checks were part of the theft (P.H. Tr., p. 44, L. 19-
p. 45, L. 20). Finally, as noted above, trial counsel's objection was that the theft 
1 And if it was a required part of the pleading such that the information was 
defective without it, that claim was required to be raised prior to trial. I.C.R. 
12(b)(6); Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622, 115 P.3d at 713. 
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by unauthorized checks should have been a separate charge of theft, and was 
therefore irrelevant and excludable as uncharged misconduct. (See also Tr., p. 
145, Ls. 14-17.) Because counsel knew that the state had provided in discovery 
evidence that Herreman-Garcia had stolen from the victim by means of 
unauthorized checks as well as by means of a debit card, knew the victim had 
testified at the preliminary hearing that part of the theft involved checks, and 
knew that the police believed checks were part of the theft, the record shows at 
least a likelihood that trial counsel made the tactical decision to try to get 
evidence regarding the unauthorized checks excluded on a variance theory 
instead of making a pre-trial objection that, even if granted, would amount to 
nothing more than an amendment of the charging document (and possibly a new 
preliminary hearing) with no long-term advantage to Herreman-Garcia. 
Herreman-Garcia has failed to show the information was defective for 
failing to give her notice of the "particular method or way" that she stole money 
from her employer during her time there as an office worker. Moreover, she 
waived any objection to any alleged lack of allegations regarding the "particular 
method or way" she stole the cash in Count I. Herreman-Garcia has therefore 
failed to set forth a viable claim of error, much less shown prejudicial 
constitutional error that is clear on the record. 
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11. 
Herreman-Garcia Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Absence Of A 
"Special" Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Herreman-Garcia claims for the first time on appeal that she was entitled 
to a special unanimity instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-33.) Review of 
applicable law, however, shows that the jury's unanimous finding that Herreman-
Garcia committed grand theft and forgery met constitutional requirements. She 
has therefore failed to show fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review 
an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant 
must show that some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." lg_,_ at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. The Jury's Unanimous Finding Of The Taking Element Was Consistent 
With Relevant Constitutional Standards 
1. Herreman-Garcia Has Shown None Of The Three Prongs Of A 
Fundamental Error Test in Relation To The Grand Theft Conviction 
When there are competing theories on how a particular element is shown 
by the evidence, jury unanimity is not constitutionally required. Schad v. Arizona, 
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501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711-12, 215 
P.3d 414, 431-32 (2009). For example, where the evidence shows the defendant 
both poisoned and suffocated the victim, the jury need not decide if the single 
crime of murder was accomplished by suffocation or poisoning. Severson, 147 
Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 ("Absent evidence of more than one instance in 
which Severson engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to 
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense."). Likewise, where a 
course of conduct constitutes a single taking, a unanimous finding of the crime is 
all that is required. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 18-19, 981 P.2d 738, 743-44 
(1999) (although there were several "incidents," Nunez not entitled to instruction 
requiring jury to "unanimously agree on the underlying act on which the misuse of 
public monies conviction was based"). 
In this case the state charged Herreman-Garcia with a single crime of theft 
for wrongfully taking cash.2 (R., pp. 52-53.) An element of the theft she was 
charged with was that she "wrongfully [took], obtain[ed], or with[held] ... 
property." I.C. § 18-2403(1 ). The jury was instructed that to find her guilty, they 
had to unanimously find that she "wrongfully took cash." (R., p. 122.) The 
evidence showed that Herreman-Garcia wrongfully took cash several times over 
a period of months or years by either improperly using a debit card or issuing 
herself unauthorized checks or paychecks. (See generally Tr.,) "Idaho law 
allows the aggregation of values of stolen property where the property is taken as 
2 As will be set forth below, the second count alleging forgery was double-
charged and therefore created an error of due process. The error was not, 
however, fundamental, and was waived by failing to object before trial. 
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part of a common scheme reflecting a single, continuing larcenous intent." State 
v. Morrison, 143 Idaho 459,462, 147 P.3d 91, 94 (Ct. App. 2006); see also State 
v. Lloyd, 103 Idaho 382, 383, 647 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1982); I.C. § 18-2407(b)(8). 
Because there was only one charged crime of grand theft, and the jury was 
unanimous that Herreman-Garcia committed it, there was no requirement of any 
specific unanimity instruction. 
Herreman-Garcia asserts she was entitled to a special unanimity 
instruction because she "committed several temporally discrete acts of both theft 
... and forgery which would independently support convictions of the charged 
crimes." (Appellant's brief, p. 29.) This argument misstates the relevant 
standards and fails to distinguish cases holding that such an instruction is not 
constitutionally required. 
In Schad, 510 U.S. at 630, the petitioner claimed error because the jury 
was not required "to agree on one of the alternative theories of premeditated and 
felony murder." The claim of error "beg[ged] the question raised" because 
answering it would "fail to address the issue of what the jury must be unanimous 
about." kl Because the state statute provided alternative means of proving the 
mental state element of the crime, "the State had proved what, under state law, it 
had to prove: that petitioner murdered either with premeditation or in the course 
of committing a robbery. The question still remains whether it was 
constitutionally acceptable to permit the jurors to reach one verdict based on any 
combination of the alternative findings." kl Because of this, "petitioner's real 
challenge is to Arizona's characterization of first-degree murder as a single crime 
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as to which a verdict need not be limited to any one statutory alternative." lg_,_ at 
630-31. "The issue in this case, then, is one of the permissible limits in defining 
criminal conduct" and "not one of jury unanimity." lg_,_ at 631. 
The Court initially answered this question "by analogy" to the "long-
established rule of the criminal law that an indictment need not specify which 
overt act, among several named, was the means by which a crime was 
committed." lg_,_ The Court noted it had "never suggested that in returning 
general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a 
single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to 
specify one alone." lg_,_ 
The Court then discussed what due process limits apply to "a State's 
capacity to define different courses of conduct, or states of mind, as merely 
alternative means of committing a single offense, thereby permitting a 
defendant's conviction without jury agreement as to which course or state 
actually occurred." lg_,_ at 632 (emphasis added). The ultimate determination is 
aimed at "differentiating what the Constitution requires to be treated as separate 
offenses." lg_,_ 
The grand theft was properly charged and tried as a single course of 
conduct offense. See I.C. § 18-2407(b)(8); Lloyd, 103 Idaho at 383, 647 P.2d at 
1255; Morrison, 143 Idaho at 462, 147 P.3d at 94. Therefore there was in this 
case no due process error arising from charging or trying "separate offenses" in a 
single count because there was only one grand theft crime. 
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The "temporally discrete acts" test advocated by Herreman-Garcia was 
applied in a case addressing a charge of possession of methamphetamine. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 29 (citing State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 181-82, 345 
P.3d 232, 240-41 (Ct. App. 2014)).) The full test is as follows: "Only when 
evidence is presented that the defendant has committed temporally discrete acts, 
each of which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged, 
should the trial court instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the 
specific incident constituting the offense .... " Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181-82, 
345 P.3d at 240-41 (emphasis altered). Unlike in possession of 
methamphetamine cases, the legislature has determined that acts of theft 
committed in a course of conduct may be aggregated. l.C. § 18-2407(b)(8); 
Lloyd, 103 Idaho at 383, 647 P.2d at 1255; Morrison, 143 Idaho at 462, 147 P.3d 
at 94. Because the course of conduct in this case was aggregated, acts of theft 
within that course of conduct, even if temporally distinct, were no longer separate 
crimes that should have been charged and tried separately. Because the charge 
and the trial addressed only a single crime of grand theft, "the jury was not 
required to unanimously agree on the facts constituting the crime." Severson, 
147 Idaho at 711, 215 P.3d at 431.3 Herreman-Garcia has failed to demonstrate 
3 The state further notes that an alternate remedy to a special unanimity 
instruction is a prosecution election of which of several criminal acts is the 
subject of the charge. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 957-58, 231 P.3d 1047, 
1054-55 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 173, 90 P.3d 920, 923 
(Ct. App. 2004). This is entirely consistent with the state's theory that the issue 
of unanimity is in question only where the separate acts are separate crimes, and 
not where the separate acts are part of the same crime. 
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that submitting the grand theft charge to the jury without requiring independent 
verdicts on each act of theft violated any constitutional right. 
Herreman-Garcia has also failed to show clear error in the record. 
According to her appellate counsel she was effectively charged with and 
prosecuted for 59 theft counts, three grand and 56 petty. (Appellant's brief, p. 
31.) If her counsel had argued that these were effectively separate charges, and 
the state must obtain verdicts on each, then the state would have no incentive to 
aggregate them. Herreman-Garcia could have been facing 59 counts of theft, 
three of them grand theft, instead of a single grand theft charge. Thus, trial 
counsel had an incentive to not raise this issue and instead face trial on a single 
count. 
More importantly, however, Herreman-Garcia has shown only that the 
need to either limit the acts the jury can consider or require that they decide 
which act was committed arises only where evidence of distinct acts that would 
be separately chargeable is presented at trial. She has not shown that multiple 
acts in a course of conduct require such steps. For example, in Severson the 
acts in question were overdosing the victim with sleeping pills and smothering 
her. 147 Idaho at 700-701, 215 P.2d at 420-21. Although each of these acts 
was necessarily done within sufficient proximity to the victim's death to be 
considered a cause of death, they could very easily have been separated by 
several hours. The temporal proximity of the acts was not a relevant 
consideration in the case because there was only a single death, and therefore a 
single crime. ~ at 711-12, 215 P.3d at 431-32; Nunez, 133 Idaho at 18-19, 981 
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P.2d at 743-44 (no requirement of special unanimity instruction on which of 
several acts constituted crime of misuse of public funds). Although the temporal 
test she advocates for has been used when such would differentiate between 
acts that are independent crimes, it is not applicable where, as here, it would not 
show that the separate acts constitute separate crimes. 
Finally, Herreman-Garcia has failed to show prejudice. The jury 
unanimously convicted her of grand theft, so any prejudice analysis must start 
from the premise that each and every juror thought she was guilty of grand theft. 
The only question is whether they would have been unable to unanimously 
decide how she was guilty of grand theft. 
The evidence presented by the state showed that Herreman-Garcia used 
the company debit card in an unauthorized fashion 17 times over slightly more 
than four months for a total theft of $6,205.50, averaging $365 per transaction. 
(Exhibit 12 (Exhibits file, p. 1508).) Over two years she issued herself 16 
duplicate paychecks and 17 paychecks including payment for hours not worked. 
(Exhibit 10 (Exhibits file, p. 1506).) The unauthorized paychecks totaled 
$9,249.53, and averaged $280.29 stolen per check. (Id.) She also issued 10 
checks directly to herself over 17 months totaling $7,492.19, the value of the 
checks averaging $749.22 per check. (Exhibit 11 (Exhibits file, p. 1507).) Three 
of the checks individually were for $1,000 or more each. (Id.) In total, the 
evidence showed that over 22 months Herreman-Garcia stole $22,947.22. The 
odds that the jury could not have unanimously agreed on an act or acts 
constituting a single count of grand theft are vanishingly small. 
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On appeal Herreman-Garcia claims she had viable defenses. These 
defenses center on claims that she had permission to do what she did. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 32-33.) The flaw in her argument is that the jury 
necessarily rejected these claims when it found her guilty of grand theft beyond a 
reasonable doubt. She also claims "there is a reasonable probability that not all 
the jurors agreed on any one instance of ... theft." (Appellant's brief, p. 33.) This 
is merely wishful thinking, not a showing from the record. The evidence shows 
she stole over $20,000. (Exhibits 10-12 (Exhibits file, pp. 1506-08).) The 
possibility that 12 jurors already convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that she 
was guilty of grand theft could not unanimously agree on a single theft or course 
of conduct by which she stole over $1000 is, at best, unlikely. 
Herreman-Garcia has failed to show fundamental error. Because there 
was only one crime of grand theft charged and proved at trial, she was not 
entitled to any remedy such as a state election of which crime was charged or a 
special unanimity instruction. Her claim of error is not clear on the record 
because there was little to no tactical advantage to be gained by requesting a 
special unanimity instruction in this case and because Herreman-Garcia has 
been unable to cite any case actually holding that a special unanimity instruction 
is constitutionally required where only one crime is charged in a single count and 
the evidence at trial proves only that one crime. Finally, she has failed to show 
prejudice because the evidence is overwhelming and the jury necessarily 
rejected her defenses and claims of innocence when it convicted her beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial. 
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2. Herreman-Garcia Has Shown None Of The Three Prongs Of A 
Fundamental Error Test In Relation To The Forgery Conviction 
The analysis on the forgery count is different because the state charged 
two crimes in a single count. "Whether a course of criminal conduct should be 
divided or aggregated depends on whether or not the conduct constituted 
'separate, distinct and independent crimes."' State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 
725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986) (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69, 383 P.2d 602, 
606 (1963)). The forgery statute defines the applicable crime as "falsely ... 
alter[ing] ... any ... check." I.C. § 18-3601. Unlike the grand theft statute, which 
aggregates multiple thefts committed as part of a single common scheme or 
plan, there is nothing in the forgery statute aggregating multiple acts of forgery 
into a single crime. Id. Thus, the state's charge that Herreman-Garcia 
committed a crime of forgery by forging "check #5008 ... and/or check #581" (R., 
p. 53) clearly combined two separate forgeries into a single count. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the law applicable to duplicitous 
charges: 
Duplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a 
single count of the charging document. A duplicitous charge can 
prejudice the defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in 
producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each 
separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in 
exposing the defendant to double jeopardy. One instance of 
duplicity occurs when the prosecution fails to recognize that each 
repetition of an act constitutes a separate offense and therefore 
includes a series of acts in one count. 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 48-49, 89 P.3d 881, 888-89 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Because a duplicitous charge is a 
problem contained within the charging document, it must be addressed prior to 
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trial. I.C.R. 12(b)(2) ("objections based on defects" in the charging document 
"must be raised prior to trial"). 4 
In this case the state charged two different forgeries in a single forgery 
count. (R., p. 53.) The jury instruction on the elements of forgery, to which trial 
counsel did not object, simply repeated the "and/or" language from the 
information. (R., p. 127.) Because the state put Herreman-Garcia on notice that 
it was including two different check forgeries in its forgery count, and Herreman-
Garcia had a procedural obligation to raise her objection to proceeding to trial on 
such an allegation, her failure to raise this issue before trial constitutes implicit 
consent to be tried as charged. She has failed to show that being tried for two 
forgeries on an "and/or" basis was a violation of an "unwaived" constitutional 
right. 
Moreover, she has failed to show that such a violation was clear in the law 
because she has failed to show that she may elect a remedy of a "special 
unanimity instruction" to a problem that was curable (and indeed, required to be 
cured) before trial. Additionally, because the state did charge two felonies in one 
count it is entirely reasonable for counsel to elect to proceed to trial on one count 
rather than raise the issue of the duplicitous charge. Although the duplicitous 
charge created a risk of a less than a unanimous verdict on a single forgery 
4 A very similar due process problem that may produce a less than unanimous 
verdict is variance, where the state's evidence presents two crimes where only 
one is charged. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008); 
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 344 P.3d 919 (2015); State v. Montoya, 140 
Idaho 160, 90 P.3d 910 (Ct. App. 2004). Unlike a duplicitous charge, this issue 
may not be addressable until trial. 
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charge, such risk was entirely tolerable given that objecting to the duplicity might 
easily result in two separate felony charges. 
Finally, there was no prejudice. The jury found her guilty of forgery 
beyond a reasonable doubt. She has presented no cogent theory based on the 
evidence as to why some jurors would have believed she forged one check but 
not the other, much less why jurors would have differed as to which check was 
forged and which was not. 
Although the forgery charge was duplicitous because it included two 
crimes of forgery within a single count, Herreman-Garcia has shown no violation 
of an unwaived constitutional right in the failure to remedy the duplicity with a 
special unanimity instruction because I.C.R. 12(b )(2) required her to seek a pre-
trial remedy. Moreover, the error she claims is not clear as a matter of law 
because no cases hold that a duplicitous charge in an information should be 
addressed through a special unanimity instruction, and there is nothing in the 
record suggesting counsel did not make a tactical decision to not challenge the 
duplicity. Finally, Herreman-Garcia has shown no prejudice. 
111. 
Herreman-Garcia Has Failed To Show Error In The Court's Rulings On 
Questions Regarding Tax Fraud 
A Introduction 
Antonio Ayon, one of the owners of A&A Landscaping, testified that the 
thefts committed by means of false paychecks came to light as a result of an 
audit of A&A's books. (Tr., p. 206, L. 24 - p. 208, L. 3.) In cross-examination 
trial counsel asked Antonio about that 2012 audit and a prior audit. (Tr., p. 215, 
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L. 8 - p. 218, L. 13.) Counsel asked, in reference to the audit that disclosed the 
paycheck discrepancies, whether Antonio "owed any money to the government 
as a result of that?" (Tr., p. 218, Ls. 14-15.) The prosecution objected on 
relevance grounds. (Tr., p. 218, Ls. 16-17.) The court, after entertaining an 
argument from trial counsel, sustained the objection. (Tr., p. 218, L. 18 - p. 219, 
L. 19.) Later in cross-examination regarding the altered checks trial counsel 
asked, "Isn't it true that by writing the check to Giselle [Herreman-Garcia] or by 
adding Giselle's name to the pay line, excuse me, that you are avoiding tax 
liability for the income-" (Tr., p. 255, Ls. 2-5.) The district court interjected itself 
into this bit of defense counsel misconduct, reaffirmed its prior relevance ruling, 
and instructed the jury that questions were not evidence. (Tr., p. 255, Ls. 6-13.) 
On appeal Herreman-Garcia claims the district court erred by excluding 
questions regarding whether the victim was engaged in tax fraud by giving the 
defendant money. (Appellant's brief, pp. 37-39.5) Review shows this claim is 
meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
5 She also challenges the rulings on her I.RE. 403 and 404(b) objections, made 
in the context of trying to exclude evidence of the grand theft that did not relate to 
the debit card. (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-36.) This argument is premised on the 
validity of her due process challenge to the information. (Id.) Because the due 
process challenge is meritless, as shown above, the state does not intend to 
further address this claim of error. 
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Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). 
C. The Questions At Issue Were Not Reasonably Likely To Elicit Relevant 
Information 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 
115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). The first question at issue was, 
"Do you know if you owed any money to the government as a result of [the 2012 
audit]?" (Tr., p. 218, Ls. 14-15.) Antonio's knowledge of whether the audit 
resulted in him owing additional taxes was not shown by any evidence to be 
relevant to the thefts or forgery. The second question, asked after the witness 
denied adding Herreman-Garcia's name to the pay line of a check (Tr., p. 254, L. 
16 - p. 255, L. 1), was, "Isn't it true that ... by adding [Herreman-Garcia]'s name 
to the pay line ... you are avoiding tax liability for the income[?]" (Tr., p. 255, Ls. 
2-5). The question about the witness's motive was irrelevant because he had 
already denied doing the act. The record thus establishes that, without evidence, 
trial counsel attempted to interject an inference that Antonio or A&A was 
engaged in tax fraud. This improper tactic was correctly rejected by the trial 
court. 
The entirety of Herreman-Garcia's argument is as follows: "Obviously, this 
evidence was relevant to establishing the defense that A&A had authorized the 
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transfer of checks to Ms. Herreman-Garcia to avoid tax liability." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 38.) Not only is this theory of relevance not "obvious," it is meritless. 
Antonio repeatedly testified that Herreman-Garcia did not have 
authorization to use the debit card, write herself personal checks, or issue herself 
paychecks that were either duplicates or for hours not worked. (Tr., p. 175, L. 14 
-p.177, L.14; p.179, Ls.1-10; p.180, Ls. 8-24; p.181, Ls.18-21; p.192, Ls.1-
11; p. 213, Ls. 7-18; p. 214, L. 25- p. 215, L. 7.) In regard to the altered checks 
under the forgery count, he testified that he re-sent the bills to the customers and 
they claimed to have paid. (Tr., p. 202, L. 15 - p. 203, L. 8.) The customers 
produced copies of the cancelled checks. (Tr., p. 203, L. 9 - p. 204, L. 9.) The 
cancelled checks provided by the customers was what revealed that the 
defendant's name had been added to the payee line. (Tr., p. 204, L. 8 - p. 206, 
L. 23; Exhibits 4 (Exhibits file, pp. 141-42), 6 (Exhibits file, p. 148).) The two 
customers confirmed these events. (Tr., p. 102, L. 25 - p. 112, L. 1; p. 114, L. 16 
- p. 123, L. 12.) Because the only evidence was that the witness did not 
authorize the acts constituting the forgery and theft, questions about whether the 
witness was motivated by a desire to commit tax fraud were irrelevant and 
misconduct. 
Moreover, Herreman-Garcia has presented no cogent legal theory 
explaining how the transactions underlying the charges in this case could have 
constituted tax fraud. Even accepting her defense theory that Antonio gave 
permission for her to do these things and that they constituted loans (see, ~. 
Tr., p. 536, L. 13 - p. 537, L. 22), Herreman-Garcia has completely failed to 
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articulate how these loans constituted tax fraud. Herreman-Garcia has failed to 
show how questions regarding taxes owed after the audit or motive to commit tax 
fraud would have elicited relevant evidence.6 
Finally, an error is harmless "if a reviewing court can find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 
887, 119 P.3d 653, 662 (Ct. App. 2005). Any error was necessarily harmless 
because, even if the questions were properly designed to elicit relevant evidence, 
the record shows that they would not have elicited evidence favorable to the 
defense. As shown above, the questions were whether the 2012 audit showed 
that A&A Landscaping owed money on taxes and the second was whether 
Antonio added Herreman-Garcia's name to the forged checks to reduce tax 
liability. The answer to the first ("Yes, we owed additional taxes" or "No, we 
owed no additional taxes") would not have reasonably changed the outcome of 
the trial. As to the second question, we know the answer-Antonio testified he 
did not alter the checks, so he necessarily did not do so to commit tax fraud.7 
6 The questions were also objectionable under I.R.E. 403 because inserting tax 
fraud allegations without any good faith basis for doing so was highly prejudicial. 
The state requests this Court to consider this as an alternative ground for 
affirming the district court. See Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County 
Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ("an 
appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative legal basis 
supports it"). 
7 Herreman-Garcia ultimately presented no evidence of tax fraud. (See generally 
Tr.) 
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Beyond a reasonable doubt, allowing the defense to question Antonio about tax 
fraud would have produced no evidence even marginally helpful to the defense, 
much less the type of evidence that would have called the overwhelming 
evidence of grand theft and forgery into doubt. The district court properly 
prevented questioning about tax liability and fraud, but even if the questions had 
been proper any error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 2015. 
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